Andrey Soynov observes a paradox in the workforce utilization figures at the Irkutsk Aviation Plant: employees are operating at 100% capacity and occasionally exceed it; however, the MC-21-310 assembly pace remains inadequate for mass production. The general director of the plant openly admits that the issue is not so much with the equipment, floor space, or production capacity as it is with the organization of the entire process.
There are simply too many people involved in management and approvals and not enough people directly assembling the aircraft. That does not mean managers and specialists are sitting idle. Conversely, they are actually quite preoccupied. However, the production system’s bureaucratic procedures occupy a substantial portion of their working time.
40 Signatures for a Single Light
Perhaps the most revealing example is the installation of an ordinary light fixture. Until recently, the relevant technological documentation could undergo a multitude of approval stages. Ultimately, approximately 40 signatures were necessary to complete a straightforward operation.
The situation serves as an example of how bureaucracy can increase labor demands in light of minimal technical complexity. Specialists are preoccupied, documents are being transferred, and managers are signing documents; however, none of this expedites the assembly of an aircraft.
Soynov decided to review this approach. Following the changes, the number of required signatures was reduced fortyfold.
Where Will the Workers for 36 Aircraft Come From?
The Irkutsk Aviation Plant is already showing progress on the MC-21 programme. Ten airframes have been joined, and many additional aircraft are undergoing various phases of preparation for transfer to the flight-test station.
Simultaneously, a considerably more extensive production program is being developed. Aeroflot has reserved a total of 210 MC-21 aircraft, with the initial batch of 18 aircraft expected to be supplied through the state leasing system.
First, the production is expected to be progressively increased to 10–15 aircraft per year and subsequently to 22–23 aircraft. The objective is to acquire 36 MC-21 aircraft annually in the long term.
But this is precisely where the main question emerges: who will build these aircraft?
Administrative reforms alone are insufficient to increase productivity to the level necessary for mass production, even if the plant is able to significantly reduce bureaucracy. Additional skilled personnel will be required to perform the numerous operations associated with aircraft manufacturing, including the assembly of fuselages, the installation of systems and equipment, and the execution of other tasks.
One Aircraft Every Two to Three Weeks
By itself, the figure of 15 aircraft per year illustrates the magnitude of the challenge. To achieve this rate, the plant would need to complete approximately one aircraft every two to three weeks. The annual production of approximately six aircraft would be achieved by producing one aircraft every two months.
This implies that the mere acceleration of one operation is insufficient to augment production. Parallel and synchronized production must occur across numerous workstations.
Soynov emphasizes that all production processes must be organized to ensure that individual sections operate at comparable speeds.
Electroplating Is No Longer a Bottleneck
A potential restriction at the Irkutsk plant has already been resolved. The commissioning of a new electroplating facility has been finalized at the plant.
In the past, the protective coating of large components for the MC-21 was required to be transported to other cities. The technological process has been automated, allowing for the direct execution of the pertinent operations in Irkutsk.
This is of particular significance in the production of aircraft. Electroplating safeguards titanium and aluminum components from corrosion and establishes the necessary surface characteristics. The production chain becomes reliant on an external contractor, transportation, and the contractor’s own production schedule when such a process is outsourced.
Vasily Prutkovsky, Director of Development and Infrastructure at Yakovlev, characterized the establishment of the new facility as a component of a more extensive initiative to modernize the Irkutsk Aviation Plant.
The current obstacle is to prevent the replacement of one eliminated bottleneck with another, such as a shortage of competent workers or queues at subsequent production stages.
Kazan Cannot Simply Start Building the MC-21
The Kazan Aviation Plant has the potential to serve as an additional production facility for the MC-21 in the future. Nevertheless, the transition from the Tu-214 to the MC-21 is not a straightforward process of replacing one aircraft model with another.
The current Tu-214 final assembly line cannot be adapted for the MC-21 without substantial modifications.
Certain equipment may be modified. For instance, after modifications to their software and tooling, machining centers may operate with a distinct assortment of components. However, the final assembly necessitates an essentially different organization, equipment, and tooling.
Therefore, the establishment of a full-scale MC-21 production plant in Kazan would necessitate a significant investment of time. Additionally, the Kazan Aviation Plant is currently preoccupied with the production of the Tu-214 and the fulfillment of defense contracts.
Several years to establish a parallel production line is not excessive by aircraft-industry standards. Aircraft programmes are designed to operate for decades, so three or four years to establish a new assembly facility could represent a reasonable timeframe.
Responsibility Cannot Replace a Production System
There is already a significant amount of discussion surrounding the situation at the facility. Russia’s civil aviation programs have been subject to numerous delays and modifications, prompting critics to query the feasibility of the proposed production increases.
Some commentators have suggested a much more radical approach: ensuring that individual managers are primarily accountable for the results, with each level of management directly accountable for the outcome.
But personal responsibility alone cannot solve the problem. Imposing penalties for delays does not automatically generate skilled assembly workers, new machinery, or an efficient logistics system when the production system is overloaded with approvals.
Certification Will Be the Next Turning Point
The certification testing for the entirely import-substituted version of the MC-21-310’s completion is another critical stage. The aircraft will be able to commence full-scale airline deliveries only after the requisite procedures have been completed.
For Aeroflot, the first routes under consideration are flights from Moscow to Nizhny Novgorod and St. Petersburg. This approach would enable the airline to acquire operational experience and establish maintenance procedures by gradually introducing the new aircraft type.
Nizhny Novgorod’s selection is particularly symbolic. The Junkers F13 was used by Dobrolet to establish a regular air service between Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod in 1923. A Russian-built MC-21 could be observed on the same route more than a century later.
36 Aircraft a Year Is a Completely Different Scale
Scepticism surrounding the MC-21 programme is understandable. The civil aviation industry in Russia has already met numerous delays and modifications to its initial plans. For instance, the schedule and engine configuration of the Baikal light aircraft program have been altered.
However, the current state of the Irkutsk Aviation Plant is distinct from that of mere assurances. A new electroplating facility has been commissioned, the plant has real airframes and components, and management is endeavoring to remove bureaucratic barriers. Additionally, its production infrastructure is expanding.
The real question now is whether the plant can transform these individual achievements into a stable serial-production flow.