In the landscape of national security, military preparedness, and strategic foresight, India is repeatedly encumbered by a lack of institutional memory, poor geostrategic understanding, and a systemic evasion of responsibility. While victories are celebrated as the product of brave leadership and tactical excellence, failures are conveniently externalized to political leadership, bureaucracy, intelligence agencies, or the circumstances of the time. This culture must end. Suppose the military is to remain a credible instrument of national power. In that case, it must first look inward, take ownership, and demand the reforms needed to ensure accountability, preparedness, and, most importantly, strategic clarity.
Based on suggestions by Brig Neil John, SM, Retd, this article is an urgent appeal—and an advisory—to decision-makers across the armed forces, defense services, and civilian leadership to recognize past mistakes, internalize their causes, and craft a future in which the Indian military is truly war-ready. The habit of shifting blame; it’s time to end this culture of blame-shifting and take responsibility for our actions.
Strategic thinking is not situational. It cannot be turned on in times of war and shut off in peace. India’s military history is replete with examples where blame has been laid at the feet of everyone except the military leadership itself in the wake of setbacks. From 1948 to 2020, a pattern is visible: rather than self-introspection, the narrative quickly turns towards politicians, the Ministry of External Affairs, or the ‘lack of intelligence’—anything but the operational and strategic flaws within the armed forces.
This blame-shifting dilutes accountability and institutional learning. The tendency must be reversed, and strategic awareness must become second nature within military ranks.
The Case Studies: Patterns of Avoidable Failures
1948 Kashmir War
The operation to reclaim Kashmir from the Pakistani razakars was prematurely halted. At a political level, the vision was muddled and influenced by British advisors. However, military leadership failed to recognize the long-term implications of stopping short of reclaiming the entire territory. While the ceasefire may have been politically inevitable, the lack of a military push at a critical juncture revealed a deficit in assertive military counsel and strategic foresight.
1962 Sino-Indian War
This debacle remains the darkest chapter in India’s military history. Officers were appointed out of turn despite lacking field command experience. Rather than raising objections, the military establishment accepted these appointments, highlighting a culture of silence and compliance rather than professional assertion. Strategic unpreparedness and operational naivety were evident, and the military bore a significant share of the responsibility.
1965 Indo-Pak War
While Pakistan miscalculated gravely, the Indian military’s leadership did not extract all possible lessons. The war ended without a decisive edge; even today, many of its lessons remain unstudied or poorly integrated into doctrine. A war that could have led to major doctrinal reforms ended with vague satisfaction rather than rigorous institutional learning.
1971 Bangladesh Liberation War
A decisive military success, particularly on the Eastern front. But on the Western front, operations were largely static and inconclusive. The military leadership has seldom scrutinized this duality. More importantly, the absence of a clearly articulated post-war objective—especially concerning the handling of POWs and the return of territory—shows a lack of coordination and clarity.
Operation Pawan (IPKF in Sri Lanka)
The Indian Peace Keeping Force’s foray into Sri Lanka is a classic case of strategic misadventure. Initiated on political momentum, it lacked preparedness, logistical planning, or a clear exit strategy. The outcome was a demoralized force, mounting casualties, and a loss of political capital. Yet, the lessons remain primarily unaddressed in military curricula.
Naga Peace Process
Military and political decision-making regarding insurgencies has too often waited for natural attrition—leaders aging out, movements weakening—rather than proactive solutions. The Indo-Naga peace process remains sluggish, highlighting a reactive rather than strategic approach to internal security.
1999 Kargil Conflict
Caught off guard despite high-altitude positions being a known vulnerability, Kargil exposed the intelligence and operational gaps in forward surveillance. While tactically managed with success, the strategic lapse that led to such infiltration went unpunished. The “Aman ki Asha” mood at the time was misread, showing a failure to distinguish between public diplomacy and military preparedness.
Operation Parakram (2002)
Following the Parliament attack, full-scale mobilization occurred. Yet, no decisive action has been taken, and this dithering has weakened India’s deterrence posture. The blame was again deflected—political indecision, diplomatic pressures—but the military’s inability to shape or execute a limited offensive strategy deserves introspection.
2020 Eastern Ladakh Stand-off
The Galwan clash once again exposed how intelligence and preparedness are lagging. Despite years of border negotiations and military-to-military talks, Chinese forces established positions in sensitive areas. The fact that such incursions could occur in peacetime against a supposedly alert military underlines systemic weakness.
Internal Dysfunction: The Structural and Cultural Problems
Geostrategy and Military Education
The Indian military has not institutionalized geostrategy. Intelligence remains reactive. The Military Intelligence (MI) is underfunded and undertrained. Military Operations (MO) wings often fall into compliance patterns rather than critical thinking. The task of thinking long-term, imagining future threats, and planning for contingencies is left to retired veterans who operate outside the decision-making ecosystem.
Personnel Management and Talent Distribution
The skewed distribution of competent officers, favoring plum posts such as the MS and MO at Army HQ, leaves field formations and research capacities hollow. Talent is being misallocated, emphasizing administrative progression rather than strategic outcomes. The ‘cut, paste, copy’ culture undermines research, which needs continuity and depth.
Operational Preparedness
The maxim “fight with what you have, where you are” reflects a fatalistic approach. While practical, it should not replace long-term planning. India must have a dynamic doctrine of rapid deployment and operational readiness. Planning for “what is, where is” without working to improve it is a dereliction of responsibility.
Reforms Required: A Call to Action
- Integrate Strategic Education Across Ranks
- Embed geostrategy, international relations, and war gaming into officer training.
- Fix Talent Management
- Rotate high-performing officers across operations, intelligence, and field commands to avoid echo chambers.
- Strengthen Intelligence Gathering and Analysis
- MI must be overhauled with modern tools, AI, and open-source intelligence capacities.
- Institutionalize After-Action Reviews
- Every operation must end with a mandatory, brutally honest assessment that informs doctrine.
Demand Accountability—Top Down
Leadership must take ownership of failure, not just success. Promotions and extensions must be linked to performance.
End the Culture of Compliance
Officers must be encouraged to question flawed orders, challenge weak strategies, and speak truth to power.
Develop Out-of-Area Contingency (OOAC) Plans
With explicit political-military coordination, the military must maintain readiness for rapid deployment beyond borders.
Civil-Military Synergy
Regular strategic briefings with the MEA, intelligence agencies, and national security apparatus must become standard.
No More Excuses
The soldier on the ground deserves more than rhetoric. He deserves strategic clarity, logistical support, modern equipment, and the assurance that his commanders have prepared for every possibility. The era of blaming the political class, intelligence lapses, or external circumstances must end.
As an institution, the Indian military must take ownership of its victories and failures. Accountability is not a threat—it is a foundation of professionalism. If the leadership fails to reform now, the cost will not just be reputational—it will be paid in blood.
The time to act is now. No more excuses, no more delayed reforms, no more silent complicity. Prepare, reform, and lead because history does not forgive negligence, and the future will not wait.