In April 1984, the Indian Army executed Operation Meghdoot, seizing the Siachen Glacier before Pakistan could occupy the heights, underscoring a critical national security decision. Today, the strategic imperative in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI) mirrors this binary choice: develop ANI as a vital power-projection base or risk ceding influence to China, a decision that demands immediate attention from policymakers.
The Geopolitical Imperative: ANI as India’s Eastern Anchor
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands hold immense strategic importance, inspiring a sense of national pride and responsibility for India’s leadership in Southeast Asia. Located at the western entrance of the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s most crucial trade chokepoints, ANI straddles the gateway between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The archipelago’s southernmost point, Indira Point, lies just 90 nautical miles from Indonesia’s Sumatra, while its northernmost point is only 22 nautical miles from Myanmar. The islands cover 30 per cent of India’s Exclusive Economic Zone while representing only 0.2 per cent of India’s landmass.
More than 90,000 merchant ships, carrying approximately 30 percent of the world’s traded goods, pass through the Malacca Strait annually. As much as 75 per cent of China’s oil imports from the Gulf region traverse these sea lanes, making them China’s energy lifeline. This creates China’s notorious ‘Malacca Dilemma,’ the fear that India or the United States could block its energy supplies during conflict. By strengthening military infrastructure in ANI, India can assume a strategic role in safeguarding regional stability and countering Chinese influence, thereby reinforcing its security responsibilities.
The Strategic Significance of the Malacca Straits for India
The Strait of Malacca is India’s most critical maritime chokepoint in the Indo-Pacific, serving as the primary gateway between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Approximately 90,000 merchant vessels pass through this 800-kilometre strait annually, carrying roughly 30 per cent of global trade and nearly half of the world’s total maritime cargo. For India, the Strait of Malacca’s strategic importance transcends commercial traffic; it is the linchpin of India’s ability to project power into Southeast Asia and monitor China’s maritime activities.
The strait lies at the southern terminus of ANI’s strategic chain, with India’s southernmost point, Indira Point, just 90 nautical miles from Sumatra, enabling surveillance and interdiction. Control over the approaches to Malacca enhances India’s leverage over China’s energy security, as 75-80 per cent of China’s Gulf-region oil imports traverse this channel, thereby creating India’s own ‘Malacca Dilemma’ as a countermeasure. This strategic position also facilitates India’s Act East Policy by enabling naval cooperation with ASEAN nations through exercises such as SIMBEX with Singapore and CORPAT with Myanmar, making ANI a critical asset for regional influence.
Furthermore, Malacca serves as the entry point for China’s String of Pearls strategy, making it essential for India to maintain strategic dominance over these waters to prevent Chinese naval penetration into the Indian Ocean Region. Without ANI as a forward base, India loses its ability to monitor, influence, or potentially block activity at this critical chokepoint, fundamentally weakening its position as a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific.
China’s Maritime Silk Road and String of Pearls
China’s efforts to expand its footprint in the Indian Ocean Region stem from its Maritime Silk Road ambitions and the need to overcome the Malacca Dilemma. China has been funding and constructing new ports while modernising existing ones across the Indian Ocean littoral states. The Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, leased to China for 99 years, exemplifies classic “Debt Trap Diplomacy.”
China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean has grown steadily since 2009, when it first deployed a PLA Navy flotilla for anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. In 2025, Chinese military vessels operated for an estimated 999 ship-days in the East and West Philippine Seas, the Sea of Japan, and the Pacific Ocean. China operates around 60 submarines, including 12 nuclear submarines, with the total expected to rise to 80 by 2035. Two Chinese vessels have recently been spotted in the Arabian Sea under the guise of “fisheries research,” raising concerns about deepening China-Pakistan military cooperation.
China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, which secures naval access through commercial ports across South Asia, threatens India’s maritime dominance. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands form a “metal chain” strung along the Bay of Bengal to the Strait of Malacca, with the potential to counter this strategy.
The US Pacific Command Rebranding and India’s Independent Interests
The United States recently dropped “Indo” from its Indo-Pacific Command, reverting to USPACOM from USINDOPACOM. This June 2026 renaming raises questions about Washington’s strategic emphasis on India’s role. The “Indo” designation, added in 2018 under Defence Secretary Jim Mattis, was a deliberate strategic signal reflecting the growing link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
However, this US rebranding cannot compromise India’s interests in the region. The term “Indo-Pacific” refers to a singular geopolitical construct with tremendous geo-economic opportunities and security challenges for Asia. While “Indo” refers to the Indian Ocean rather than India specifically, global communities expect India to play a significant role in fostering an environment conducive to economic growth. India’s Act East Policy, SAGAR doctrine, and aspiration to be a “net security provider” must continue regardless of changes in US nomenclature.
The Andaman and Nicobar Command: India’s Tri-Service Advantage
Post-Kargil, India established the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) in October 2001, its first and only integrated tri-service command. ANC is responsible for the defence of the islands, maritime surveillance, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and the protection of offshore installations. The command conducts Defence Diplomacy through joint naval exercises with maritime neighbours, including CORPAT with Myanmar, SIMBEX with Singapore, MILAN, and others in the Andaman Sea.
The INS KOHASSA airfield at the northernmost point holds strategic significance, enabling ANC to operate freely across all regions of ANI. India aims to launch joint projects with Japan and the United States to deploy underwater surveillance sensors (SOSUS) near these islands, enhancing maritime domain awareness, similar to the US-Japan “Fish Hook” network in the South China Sea. This is critical for tracking Chinese submarine movements in the deep Indo-Pacific.
The Environmental and Tribal Concern: A Valid Counterpoint, especially regarding the potential impact on indigenous tribes and local ecosystems, underscores the need for balanced development. Addressing these concerns is essential to ensure sustainable, strategic growth without compromising environmental integrity or tribal rights.
The Leader of the Opposition recently presented visuals highlighting concerns about the environment, ecology, and indigenous privacy in ANI. The Congress party has described the proposed ₹72,000-₹81,000 crore Great Nicobar infrastructure upgrade as a “grave threat” to indigenous inhabitants and the fragile ecosystem.
The project involves felling nearly one million trees in pristine rainforests, destroying coral reefs, and threatening the Nicobar Megapode bird and leatherback turtles that nest in Galathea Bay. The island is home to the Shompen, a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group of hunter-gatherers, with an estimated population of only 250 individuals. The Shompen remain highly vulnerable to infectious diseases due to limited contact with the outside world.
In November 2022, the Tribal Council of Great Nicobar and Little Nicobar retracted its no-objection certificate, citing the administration’s lack of transparency regarding tribal reserve lands. The National Green Tribunal placed a temporary stay on the project in April 2023 and directed the constitution of a High-Powered Committee to revisit EIA deficiencies.
Balancing Security and Ecology: The Critical Path Forward
Indian defence planners have been castigated for failing to peer into the crystal ball to foresee geopolitical events. Yet when they plan for “power projection for national security,” the world seems about to end. The challenge is to ensure that crass commercialisation does not destroy the ecology while developing supporting infrastructure.
India must develop ANI as a strategic base while maintaining ecological sensitivity. The islands can be developed into a self-sustaining economic model with a “dual maritime ecosystem” that combines commercial and military infrastructure. The Chennai-Andaman optical fibre cable project is a positive step towards development.
Care must be taken to avoid the mistakes seen at other Indian tourist and religious sites. Whether in the Himalayas, the North East, the coastal south, or Rajasthan’s deserts, sheer numbers outstrip local resources. ANI development must include:-
Strict environmental safeguards. Comprehensive field studies before conservation plans for leatherback turtles, saltwater crocodiles, and Nicobar megapodes are formulated.
Tribal consultation. Proper Social Impact Assessment with the Anthropological Survey of India, ensuring Shompen and Nicobarese consent
Sustainable tourism. Limited, controlled visitor numbers prevent resource strain.
Dual-use infrastructure. Military and civilian facilities sharing resources efficiently.
Power Projection: India’s Southeast Asia Moment
Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja, Retd, says India needs to “grow out of earlier thinking” and develop ANI as a hub or “springboard” for power projection. India is transforming ANI into an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” crucial for controlling the Indian Ocean surface and power projection.
ANI facilitates domination of the Bay of Bengal, the Six-degree Channel, the Ten-degree Channel, and parts of the Indian Ocean. These islands could enable India to conduct multiple military operations to keep the busiest sea lanes under surveillance. ANI connects South Asia to Southeast Asia, covering about 30 percent of India’s EEZ.
India’s maritime partnership enhancements with the US, Japan, Australia, and France depend on ANI’s geo-strategic location. The islands allow India to extend its military reach toward Southeast Asia, giving it a strategic edge in the increasingly important Indo-Pacific theatre.
The Binary Choice Remains
The Siachen precedent taught India that in national security, the choice is binary. Either you occupy the strategic heights, or your enemy will. In the maritime domain, if India develops ANI as a strategic base for power projection in Southeast Asia, or China fills the vacuum through its String of Pearls.
The US may have dropped “Indo” from its Pacific Command, but India’s interests in the Indo-Pacific cannot be compromised. China’s persistent naval activities, submarine expansion, and Maritime Silk Road ambitions demand a strategic response from India. ANI is India’s eastern anchor, its firewall against eastern threats, and its power-projection platform.
Environmental and tribal concerns are valid and must be addressed through careful planning, comprehensive consultations, and sustainable development. But these concerns cannot become excuses for strategic neglect. India must learn from defence planners’ past failures to anticipate geopolitical shifts while ensuring that commercialisation does not destroy the ecology.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands must become India’s unsinkable fortress, a strategic springboard for engagement with Southeast Asia, a surveillance hub for monitoring the Strait of Malacca, and a deterrent against Chinese maritime expansion.
The binary choice remains: develop ANI strategically, or lose the Indo-Pacific to China. Given the Siachen lesson from 1984, India cannot afford to wait.
