Operation Sindoor, the May 2025 cross-border strikes that dismantled terror networks in Pakistan-occupied territory, signaled a strategic shift in India’s air power. For decades, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has aimed to reach a target of 42 fighter squadrons, which is regarded as the minimum for a two-front war. However, the changing technological landscape, evolving threat profiles, and the nature of modern combat suggest that even 42 squadrons might not be enough. More importantly, focusing on numbers alone may not guarantee our safety.
India’s response to this new era must go beyond just increasing numbers. There is a need for a strategic shift in our approach: instead of simply counting airframes, we should emphasise networked lethality, the capacity to sense, decide, and strike faster than the enemy.
Lessons from Operation Sindoor
While the lessons from Operation Sindoor must have been collated at the Service HQ, an assessment can be made on what must have been key challenges. Precision strikes consume munitions rapidly and stress logistics. Adversaries respond with electronic warfare, dispersal, and counter-strikes. And the information domain space, cyber, and communications are as contested as the skies.
These lessons point to one conclusion: India needs an air force that can survive first contact, sustain high tempo, and deliver decisive effect deep inside enemy territory, all while protecting pilots and critical assets.
Pillar 1 — Fifth-Generation Fighters as Orchestrators
India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is our bet on stealth and sensor fusion. These jets should be seen not just as fighters but as airborne command nodes controlling loyal-wingman drones, managing strike packages, and fusing battlefield data.
Rather than distributing them thinly, they must be concentrated into survivable hubs with hardened shelters and dispersed runways. In a future war, their value will lie not in “numbers in the air” but in how well they orchestrate the rest of the force.
Pillar 2 — Loyal-Wingman Drones and Attractable UCAVs
The days of risking manned fighters for every suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) mission are over. Loyal-wingman drones can fly ahead, draw fire, jam radars, and deliver stand-in weapons. When paired with manned jets, they multiply reach and create multiple dilemmas for enemy air defence. The IAF effectively demonstrated this; however, details are not in the public domain.
India’s HAL CATS Warrior programme and private-sector efforts must be accelerated and inducted into operational squadrons, not left as tech demos. UCAVs, cheaper and expendable strike drones, should form the bulk of this unmanned layer, allowing us to accept attrition without losing pilots.
Pillar 3 — Long-Range Standoff Weapons
In a two-front scenario, India must strike enemy airbases, logistics hubs, and command centres at risk without always crossing the border with manned aircraft.
Air-launched BrahMos, extended-range cruise missiles, and future hypersonic glide vehicles are critical. These weapons give India the ability to strike deep, shape the battlefield, and control escalation by choosing the time, place, and scale of response.
Pillar 4 — ISR, Electronic Warfare and Hardened C2
Modern combat is a contest of networks. Persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) from satellites to AEW&C to loitering sensors must feed into secure command networks that can survive cyber and kinetic attacks. India needs to have its low-orbit satellites to ensure unrestricted communications and precision navigation, as well as post-strike damage assessment.
Electronic warfare (EW) must be upgraded from a support function to a core mission area, capable of blinding enemy sensors and protecting our own. Without this backbone, neither loyal wingmen nor standoff missiles can be employed to full effect.
Pillar 5 — Industrial Surge and Logistics
Numbers matter only if they can be sustained. Squadron strength depends on engines, spares, munitions, and technicians.
India must create surge capacity: multiple assembly lines for Tejas Mk-1A/Mk-2, fast-track AMCA production, indigenous engine programmes, and private-sector partnerships for missiles and drones. Wartime reserves of precision weapons should be stockpiled now, not after the first strike.
Putting It All Together: The Future Kill Chain
Picture this: satellites detect an enemy build-up. AEW&C cues a 5th-gen AMCA flight. Loyal-wingmen fan out ahead, suppress radars and feed live video back. The AMCA remains outside hostile missile envelopes while ordering BrahMos launches from Su-30MKIs and UCAVs. Deep targets are destroyed, runways cratered, and logistics choked, all while manned fighters and pilots remain protected.
This is not distant science fiction; the technology exists. What is needed is doctrine, integration, and political will.
Doctrine and Training Reform
Hardware without doctrine is theatre. India must codify Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) at the squadron level, train for distributed operations with dispersed bases and rapid runway repair, and build joint kill-chain planning cells at the theatre command level.
EW and cyber must become career tracks with specialists inducted at scale. Pilot and UAV operator training pipelines must be expanded and cross-trained for joint missions.
Policy and Budget Priorities
This shift will cost money, but smarter spending can deliver better outcomes than simply adding squadrons.
Multi-year funding for AMCA, engines, and loyal-wingmen with strict milestone tracking.
Public-private partnerships for missile, avionics, and drone production.
Surge munitions fund for wartime replenishment.
Exportable variants of UCAVs and sensors to generate revenue and sustain production lines.
Managing Risks and Escalation
Networked warfare comes with vulnerabilities: cyber-attacks, jamming, and satellite strikes could degrade effectiveness. India must invest in redundant communications, hardened command posts, and pre-planned autonomous modes for drones.
Escalation management is equally critical. Clear political thresholds for cross-border use of standoff weapons must be laid down, alongside hotlines and de-escalation mechanisms to avoid miscalculation.
Conclusion — From Counting Aircraft to Measuring Effects
The “42-squadron” figure has become a political talking point, but air power in 2025 cannot be measured in squadrons alone. Effect, not count, must become the new metric.
India’s air force must be a networked, layered, and resilient instrument, one that blends survivable 5th-gen fighters, massed loyal-wingmen, potent standoff weapons, and a fused ISR/EW backbone. Industrial surge capacity and logistics resilience must underwrite this force.
If implemented now, this transformation can ensure that India not only wins the next Operation Sindoor but deters it from becoming necessary in the first place.