Elon Musk’s complaint that “oligarchs” are blocking Starlink’s entry into India illustrates the gap between technological power and strategic understanding. India has no obligation to accommodate an American billionaire’s timetable, however convinced he may be that his technology deserves special treatment. The Indian market is too large to ignore and too independent to take instructions from abroad.
Musk alleged that unnamed interests were seeking to preserve a monopoly, even describing the alleged obstruction as a “crime against the people of India.” These are serious accusations that require evidence. There is also an unmistakable irony in a man who commands immense economic and technological power suddenly presenting himself as a critic of concentrated wealth and influence. Even the American oligarch, to borrow his own favoured term, should remember that power does not confer an automatic right of entry.
The regulatory position requires precision. On 8 October 2026, India’s Ministry of Communications said that the three licensed satellite communications operators were at broadly the same regulatory stage, with security assessments under way for all three before spectrum assignment could be sought. The ministry rejected the suggestion of discrimination. Its statement does not answer every question about the process, but it challenges the simplistic explanation that Musk alone is being held back by his competitors.
Some American companies approach foreign markets with a familiar attitude: we have the money and the technology, so we will decide how things work. Success elsewhere can lead their executives to regard local requirements as a nuisance and resistance to their terms as evidence of backwardness. In India, that mindset can quickly turn a cultural misjudgement into a business failure.
India also harbours suspicion towards an American approach that tries to turn partnership into obedience. History helps explain that suspicion. For decades, India maintained close ties with the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia, even when they were major rivals of Washington. It also upheld a tradition of nonalignment and, later, strategic autonomy. Those relationships do not mean that India is opposed to the United States. They mean that it rejects the assumption that somebody else should draw up its list of acceptable partners.
Relations between India and the United States have expanded over recent decades in trade, technology, and defence. A substantial basis for cooperation has emerged between countries with shared interests, alongside disagreements that persist. Yet just when deeper engagement seemed possible, Donald Trump, America’s redheaded sheriff, chose to address India in the language of ultimatums.
The threat became policy. In August 2025, Trump ordered an additional tariff of 25 percent on imports from India, subject to the exemptions in the order, citing its purchases of Russian oil. That additional tariff was removed in February 2026. But withdrawing a tariff does not necessarily erase the earlier message: Washington seeks to decide where India buys its energy and to punish it for choosing other priorities. In my view, that approach undermines the trust on which a partnership depends.
Threats can hurt exporters and create economic pressure. They do not build trust with India. When an American demand is perceived as an attempt to impose policy from outside, it can encourage disengagement and a search for alternatives. Anyone who believes that a public threat can turn India into an obedient partner has misunderstood the country with which he hopes to do business.
Working with India requires harmony, mutual cultural understanding, and respect for the interests of both sides. That means a willingness to listen, understand its security and energy needs, and seek agreements that each side can justify to its own public. New Delhi has priorities of its own. Independent decision-making is not a defect that Washington is authorised to correct.
American political conduct does not stop at the doors of government offices. It also shapes the atmosphere in which American companies operate. When Washington puts pressure on India, its message cannot be expected to remain detached from business discussions, investment decisions, or the willingness to trust. An American company seeking success in India must demonstrate respect for the market through its own conduct, even when its government talks down to the country.
In my experience developing strategies for international market entry, companies sometimes confuse the quality of their product with the quality of their strategy. Even an excellent technological solution can fail when the business model or the approach to building relationships does not suit the market. In India, that mismatch can prove decisive before price is even discussed.
Large Indian companies understand their market and the institutional and political system within which it operates. Their distribution networks, experience with customers, and understanding of how decisions are made are substantial business assets. A foreign company can acquire that understanding, but it must work at it over time. A handful of senior meetings or an impressive product cannot substitute for accumulated local knowledge.
Starlink has already taken an important step in this direction. In March 2025, SpaceX announced agreements with Airtel and Jio, subject to the necessary authorisations. Local partnership is therefore already part of Starlink’s strategy. The challenge now is to turn those agreements into effective cooperation, grounded in trust and adapted to India. Remarks that disparage the local business establishment can damage precisely the relationships the company is trying to build.
Even an influential partner cannot guarantee every approval or make every disagreement disappear. Its value lies in understanding local conditions, developing a suitable service, and helping the company work through the process. Anyone seeking a shortcut instead of a serious partnership may discover that the time supposedly saved carries a substantial cost later.
Price presents another test. The promise of accessible internet must be assessed against what an Indian customer actually has to pay. The subscription is only part of the bill; equipment, installation, and service also affect affordability. A sum that appears trivial to American management may present a serious barrier to an Indian household. Superior technology does not remove that sensitivity.
In remote areas where terrestrial infrastructure is difficult to build, satellite communications could offer considerable value. Schools and healthcare institutions may be important customers alongside households. Turning that potential into a business, however, requires clear answers about who pays, how the service is delivered, and what value it offers compared with the alternatives. India’s people are not a moral argument to be invoked in pursuit of a license. They are customers whose needs must be understood.
India, too, must insist on fair competition, transparency, and reasonable timelines. Local companies should not be shielded from competitors simply because they are Indian. The right approach is to impose equivalent requirements and give every company that meets them a chance to compete. A demand for fair treatment, however, does not entitle a foreign company to dictate a country’s priorities.
For Musk, this is a lesson to learn before his next venture. Entering the Indian market requires serious preparation, respect for local partners, and a business model suited to the country. Ego has a price. It can be paid in lost time, weakened relationships, and opportunities surrendered to competitors who understood India better.
India has interests of its own. Anyone seeking a place in its market must learn to build a relationship with it, rather than presume to run it.