Russia has once again brought global attention to its strategic missile arsenal after another high-profile test of the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, commonly referred to in Western media as “Satan II.” The missile was referred to as “the most powerful missile system in the world,” by President Vladimir Putin, who asserted that it could overcome all current and prospective missile defense systems.
The Sarmat is not just another intercontinental ballistic missile. It embodies a strategic deterrence philosophy that is distinctively Russian, characterized by its extreme range, huge throw weight, flexible warhead configurations, and capacity to attack from unconventional trajectories. The United States and China are currently in the process of quickly modernizing their respective nuclear missile forces. However, Russia’s Sarmat is in a category that neither Washington nor Beijing can directly match.
The Sarmat Program’s Inception
NATO refers to the Soviet-era R-36M2 Voyevoda missile as the SS-18 “Satan” in NATO terminology. The RS-28 Sarmat was developed to replace it. Designed during the Cold War to guarantee that the Soviet Union could retaliate with overwhelming force even after a devastating first strike, the original SS-18 was one of the heaviest and most destructive nuclear missiles ever built.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of those missiles remained operational but increasingly obsolete. To preserve the concept of a super-heavy strategic missile while incorporating contemporary propulsion, guidance, and penetration technologies, Russia initiated the Sarmat program.
The Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau developed the missile, which was later manufactured with the assistance of many significant Russian defense enterprises.
In comparison to many contemporary solid-fuel missiles, the Sarmat uses liquid-fuel propulsion. Although liquid-fueled missiles are more complicated and necessitate more maintenance, they provide major benefits in terms of energy yield and payload capacity. This decision demonstrates Russia’s priorities, which are characterized by a focus on maximal destructive capability and flexibility, rather than simplicity or rapid field deployment.
Sarmat’s Fundamental Technology
The Sarmat is a three-stage liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile that weighs over 200 tons at its core. Its range is estimated to be between 10,000 and 18,000 kilometers, although Russian officials have asserted an even greater suborbital reach.
The missile’s launch weight is its unique feature, which is the weight of the payload it can carry over intercontinental distances. Sarmat is capable of delivering an estimated 10 tons of payload, which is considerably more than the payload capacity of the majority of modern ICBMs, according to analysts.
This massive payload capacity enables several strategic options.
First, the missile is capable of delivering multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, which are commonly referred to as MIRVs. Each warhead has the capacity to impact an individual target that is located hundreds of kilometers away. In theory, a single Sarmat launch could simultaneously pose a threat to multiple cities, military bases, or command centers.
Secondly, it is stated that Sarmat is capable of deploying hypersonic glide vehicles, including the Avangard system. Hypersonic glide vehicles operate at incredibly high speeds during atmospheric reentry, which renders interception significantly more challenging than traditional ballistic warheads that adhere to predictable trajectories.
Third, the missile is capable of carrying decoys and penetration aids that are intended to confuse missile defense systems. These consist of radar decoys, electronic countermeasures, and bogus targets that are designed to overwhelm defensive interceptors.
Why Russia Still Prefers Heavy Liquid-Fueled Missiles
Solid-fuel missiles are becoming the preferred choice of most of modern nuclear powers due to their ease of storage, rapidity of launch, and operational safety. For instance, the United States is heavily dependent on the solid-fuel Minuteman III system and its upcoming successor, the Sentinel.
Russia, on the other hand, continues to prioritize heavy liquid-fueled missiles due to strategic doctrine and geography.
For many years, Russian military strategists have harbored concerns regarding the development of American missile defense systems. Moscow believes that smaller missiles with fewer warheads may ultimately become vulnerable to interception. Sarmat and other heavy missiles address this issue by overwhelming defenses with their enormous payload volume.
A heavy missile is capable of simultaneously deploying a multitude of glide vehicles, electronic warfare systems, decoys, and warheads. Even if some are intercepted, it is expected that others will be able to penetrate defenses.
This is the reason why Russian analysts often refer to Sarmat as a “missile defense killer” rather than just a missile.
The Concept of Fractional Orbital Bombardment
One of the most controversial features associated with Sarmat is its reported capability for fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS)-type trajectories.
The North Pole is the shortest route between the United States and Russia, which is why traditional ICBMs travel over it. The missile defenses and early-warning radars of the United States are highly optimized for this northern trajectory.
The equation is altered by a FOBS-style attack, which enables the missile to approach from unexpected directions, such as the South Pole. This results in a reduction in warning time and complicates radar surveillance.
Although analysts disagree on the practicality of such missions, the capability itself is of strategic significance because it compels adversaries to defend against a variety of attack vectors.
In recent years, China has also conducted experiments with technologies similar to orbital bombardment, which has caused concern among US defense planners. Nevertheless, the operational system associated with this concept that has garnered the most attention is Russia’s Sarmat.
The Avangard Connection
When combined with the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, the Sarmat becomes particularly hazardous.
Conventional ballistic warheads reenter the atmosphere in predictable trajectories. Missile defense systems compute these trajectories and endeavor to intercept them during the midcourse or terminal phases.
That model is wholly changed by Avangard.
The glide vehicle is launched into near-space by an ICBM, and it reenters the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds that reportedly exceed Mach 20 after separating. Then, it descends toward its objective, performing vertical and lateral maneuvers.
This maneuverability renders trajectory prediction exceedingly challenging. The current missile defense systems are designed to be effective against predictable ballistic trajectories, rather than atmospheric hypersonic gliders that are engaged in evasive maneuvers.
Russia regards this technology as its response to the large investment in missile defense architecture by the United States over the course of several decades.
How far behind is the United States?
The answer is contingent upon the specific technology aspect being compared.
The United States is considerably behind Russia in terms of missile size and payload capacity due to the fact that Washington ended the pursuit of super-heavy ICBMs.
The future LGM-35 Sentinel program prioritizes precision, digital modernization, survivability, and reliability over large throw weight. American strategy is increasingly dependent on stealth bombers and submarines to provide survivable deterrence.
In contrast, Russia continues to prioritize the development of massive missiles that are situated in silos and are capable of transporting substantial warhead loads.
Nevertheless, the United States is the leader in a number of other critical areas.
The missile guidance systems, satellite infrastructure, early-warning networks, and nuclear command-and-control systems of the United States are generally regarded as more advanced and reliable. In addition, the operational capabilities of US solid-fuel missile technology are more advanced.
Furthermore, Russia is unable to match the stealth and quietness of the US Navy’s Ohio-class and the future Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, which serve as an exceptionally survivable deterrent force.
Operational hypersonic deployment is the most significant area in which the United States may presently be behind. Russia fielded Avangard years before the US deployed comparable strategic hypersonic systems. Russia has established an early technological and political advantage in this field, despite the fact that Washington is swiftly accelerating development programs.
However, many Western analysts warn that Russian assertions regarding Sarmat and Avangard may be exaggerated for strategic messaging purposes.
What is the comparative status of China?
China occupies a midpoint between the United States and Russia.
Over the past decade, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force has experienced massive expansion. The DF-41 and the more recent DF-27 are major developments in the strategic missile capability of China.
The DF-41 is a solid-fuel ICBM that is highly capable and has an extended range, as well as the ability to perform MIRV. It is road-mobile, which enhances its survivability in comparison to silo-based systems.
Additionally, China is making major investments in the development of orbital bombardment concepts and hypersonic technology. American defense officials have repeatedly expressed apprehension regarding Chinese testing of hypersonic glide systems.
Nevertheless, China does not presently have an equivalent to Sarmat in terms of raw size or payload.
A smaller deterrent force that prioritized assured retaliation over an overwhelming counterforce capability was traditionally the focus of Chinese doctrine. Despite the rapid evolution of this situation, Beijing still appears to favor mobile solid-fuel systems over massive liquid-fueled missiles.
Therefore, Russia maintains a unique position with the Sarmat, a super-heavy strategic missile that is specifically engineered to overwhelm missile defenses by achieving payload saturation.
The Question of Reliability
The program faced many delays and noticeable test failures, despite the unsettling image that surrounds Sarmat. The reports from 2024 and 2025 indicated that launches were unsuccessful and that catastrophic silo incidents occurred during testing.
Western analysts have observed that the construction and maintenance of a 200-ton liquid-fueled missile are exceedingly challenging.
Liquid propellants are corrosive and toxic. The silo infrastructure requirements remain exorbitant, while the missile’s complexity increases maintenance burdens.
This poses a critical strategic question: Does Russia place a higher value on psychological deterrence and symbolic power than on actual operational efficiency?
The answer is likely yes.
The Sarmat is not just a weapon. Additionally, it serves as a geopolitical indicator. Every publicized launch serves as a reminder that Russia remains one of the world’s preeminent nuclear powers, despite economic sanctions and battlefield difficulties in other regions.
The Future of Strategic Deterrence
The Sarmat program underscores a more extensive transformation in global nuclear strategy.
The quantity of warheads was the primary factor in deterrence during the Cold War. Currently, missile defense penetration and survivability are of equal significance.
Russia’s response involves hypersonic maneuverability and enormous payloads.
Stealth, submarines, networked command systems, and precision modernization are the responses of the United States to the challenges of the 21st century.
Mobility, rapid expansion, and diversified strategic systems appear to be China’s response.
The outcome is a new strategic arms competition that is increasingly preoccupied with the development of sophisticated delivery systems, rather than merely the number of warheads.
Systems such as Sarmat are becoming symbols of a renewed era of strategic rivalry, as the last significant US-Russia nuclear arms treaty framework is under severe strain.