For decades, Motor Sich was a strategically important industrial company in the post-Soviet world. Russian helicopters, transport aircraft, industrial turbines, and energy systems throughout Eurasia were propelled by the company’s engines. The Soviet planners had established a comprehensive aerospace ecosystem in which Ukraine was responsible for the majority of engine manufacturing, while Russia was responsible for the final assembly and design of aircraft. This interdependence continued following the Soviet Union’s collapse.
But today, Russia is steadily moving beyond Motor Sich.
Viktor Kladov, the director of international cooperation at Rostec, stated at the Russian-Chinese EXPO in Harbin that Russia is in the process of developing a new ultra-heavy engine to replace products that were previously associated with Motor Sich.
The announcement is the result of a process that commenced over a decade ago when Moscow recognized that its dependence on Ukrainian aerospace manufacturing had become a strategic vulnerability. The aviation engine sector in Russia is undergoing a significant transformation, transitioning from helicopters to heavy transport aircraft, as a result of the incremental evolution of what began as emergency import substitution.
The Soviet Legacy That Ukraine Inherited
Upon the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine acquired a number of sophisticated industrial assets; however, few were as globally significant as Motor Sich. The organization was a key player in Soviet aerospace supply chains and specialized in the production of gas turbine engines for aircraft and helicopters.
Motor Sich products powered some of the most recognizable Soviet and Russian aircraft and helicopters, including the Mil Mi-8, Mil Mi-17, Mil Mi-24, Mil Mi-28, Kamov Ka-52, Mil Mi-26, and Antonov An-124 Ruslan.
The TV3-117 and VK-2500 engine families of the company were particularly important because they served as the foundation of Russian helicopter aviation.
Motor Sich was not just selling engines to Russia. It was located within a shared Soviet industrial ecosystem that was interconnected with Ukrainian engine production, including Russian aircraft factories, maintenance centers, spare parts systems, and military logistics.
The ecosystem thrived during the 1990s and early 2000s as a result of the mutual benefits of cooperation between the two countries. Motor Sich’s largest and most natural market was Russia, while Ukrainian factories were extensively reliant on Russian contracts and long-term fleet servicing.
The Political Break That Changed Everything
The turning point came after 2014.
Ukraine suspended military-technical cooperation with Russia amid deteriorating relations between Moscow and Kyiv. Motor Sich’s products, such as the TV3-117 and VK-2500 helicopter engines, were directly impacted by sanctions and export restrictions.
This was a strategic blow for Russia.
Some helicopter programs were entirely dependent on Ukrainian engines or components that were associated with Ukrainian supply chains. The Russian military aviation was unable to tolerate the uncertainty surrounding spare parts, maintenance, or future production.
Simultaneously, the rupture caused a severe crisis for Motor Sich.
For decades, the organization had been extensively included in the Russian aviation sector. The Russian helicopter fleets were not only an important market but also an extensive operational ecosystem. General Electric, Pratt & Whitney, and Rolls-Royce Holdings were already the dominant companies in the Western aerospace markets.
Western aviation ecosystems are considerably consolidated around existing suppliers, certification systems, and NATO-aligned industrial networks, in contrast to Soviet-era aerospace cooperation. For a corporation that was designed around Russian and Soviet platforms, it was always going to be exceedingly challenging to penetrate those markets.
This is the reason why many analysts regarded the political collapse of Russian-Ukrainian cooperation as economically catastrophic for Motor Sich in the long term.
Russia’s Initiative to Replace Imports
Moscow responded aggressively.
One of the most extensive aerospace localization initiatives in the annals of post-Soviet Russia was initiated by the Kremlin. The goal was unambiguous: to eliminate reliance on Ukrainian engines and to reestablish the entire production chain within Russia.
United Engine Corporation became the center of this effort, particularly through the work of the Klimov design bureau and associated manufacturing plants.
Russia had already initiated the process of preparing for increased autonomy in the production of helicopter engines prior to 2014. Moscow had previously worked to further integrate Ukrainian engine manufacturing; however, these efforts were unsuccessful, prompting Moscow to establish a production base that was entirely domestic.
The process of localization proceeded in phases.
Engines were built first by Russia using Ukrainian components. Turbine blades, combustion chambers, transmissions, electronic control systems, and hot-section components were gradually manufactured domestically by Russian enterprises.
The dependence issue for key helicopter engines was identified to have been effectively resolved by Moscow in the late 2010s.
The VK-2500 Emerges as Russia’s Workhorse
The VK-2500 was the most prominent outcome of this transition.
The VK-2500, which was initially linked to Ukrainian production networks, has since become the main helicopter engine produced domestically in Russia.
It is the driving force behind platforms such as the Kamov Ka-52, Mil Mi-28, and Mil Mi-17.
The Russian industry made substantial investments in the expansion of its production capacity for the VK-2500. Output was greatly improved through the reconstruction of manufacturing facilities and testing infrastructure.
The localized VK-2500 was also emphasized by Russian manufacturers as having higher reliability, improved safety standards, and the use of newer materials in comparison to obsolete production chains.
The transition was not without its challenges. In recent years, Russian officials have acknowledged that the demand for VK-2500 engines exceeded production capacity as a result of the significant size of helicopter requirements.
However, the shortage also served as an illustration of the extent to which Russia had transitioned from its dependence on Motor Sich. Ukrainian supply disruptions were no longer the source of the bottleneck. Russia’s domestic demand was expanding at a brisk pace.
Replacing the Most Difficult Motor-Sich Engines
The challenge was not limited to helicopter motors.
The Mil Mi-26 is equipped with the large D-136 engine, which was also manufactured by Motor Sich.
The D-136 continues to be one of the most powerful helicopter engines ever built. A technological advance that was significantly more ambitious was necessary to replace this category of engine.
Russia’s response is becoming more closely associated with the expanded PD engine family and the development of new heavy-engine programs by Rostec and United Engine Corporation. Russia currently has two projects to replace this engine, including the PD-8V for the Mi-26 helicopter and the PD-12V for the Chinese Advanced Heavy Lifter helicopter program.
The PD-35 is one of the most significant initiatives
The Russian Antonov An-124 Ruslan is powered by four Ivchenko-Progress D-18T turbofan engines. In 2024, the then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that the UZGA joint-stock company had successfully implemented measures on import substitution of engine elements of Ukrainian production. “As of today, 49 engines have been repaired and put into operation,” the minister said, opening the meeting.
Shoigu said the repair and modernization of D-18T will allow extending the service life of the An-124 aircraft from 20 to 45 years. “The serial production of Russian D-18T engines is currently being mastered, which is scheduled to start in the fourth quarter of 2027. This will make it possible to increase air transport volumes in the interests of the Armed Forces,” Sergei Shoigu added.
The D-18T engine generates a thrust of 23,400 kgf and was created by the Progress design bureau in Zaporozhye and manufactured at the Motor-Sich plant. Currently, Russia lacks an engine capable of producing a thrust of 23-25 tonnes.
It is anticipated that the PD-26, a derivative of the PD-35, will serve as Russia’s premier ultra-heavy engine platform for industrial applications and future military transport aircraft. The engine is equipped with digital control systems, advanced turbine technologies, modern composite materials, and enhanced fuel efficiency.
The newer Russian engines are designed to compete by using modern manufacturing methods, modular production, and lifecycle efficiency, in contrast to the older Soviet engines that prioritized brute durability.
The “super-heavy” PD-35 engine program strongly implies that Russia now believes it can completely transcend Motor Sich’s heavy-engine legacy.
From aerospace to energy infrastructure
A neglected aspect of Motor Sich’s legacy was its involvement in mobile energy systems and industrial gas turbines.
Gas turbine power stations and industrial engines derived from aviation were manufactured by the organization for the purpose of electricity generation and gas extraction infrastructure.
Russia is currently incorporating these capabilities into its own industrial engine ecosystem.
Rostec has been promoting aviation-derived turbines for its mobile power plants, Arctic infrastructure, gas compression systems, and emergency electricity generation.
This is significant because aviation turbines are among the most sophisticated high-power systems in industrial engineering. Mastering them generates cascading effects that extend to heavy manufacturing, metallurgy, and energy infrastructure.
In other words, Russia’s strategy following the Motor Sich has not been limited to military aviation. It is assisting Moscow in the restoration of a more comprehensive industrial sovereignty.
Is it possible that Motor Sich could have had a more favorable future in Russia?
This issue continues to be one of the most contentious questions regarding the organization’s decline.
Motor Sich’s economic foundation was historically most strong within the Russian-led aerospace ecosystem for which it was originally designed, from a strictly industrial perspective.
Russia contributed an enormous quantity of engine demand; shared technical standards; vast helicopter fleets; long-term servicing contracts; integrated Soviet logistics networks; and compatible aircraft programs.
In contrast, the integration into Western aerospace markets would have necessitated a complete realignment of strategic and industrial priorities.
Motor Sich was not a startup that was in quest of buyers. It was a Soviet aerospace behemoth that was designed to operate on Russian aviation platforms. The economic logic upon which the company had operated for decades was fundamentally altered by the severance of those connections.
In the interim, Russia responded by expediting the development of domestic engines at a rate that was initially deemed unattainable by many observers.
The crisis did not result in the collapse of Russian helicopter aviation; rather, it facilitated the development of a more self-sufficient Russian aerospace engine industry. Moscow capitalized on the disruption to modernize manufacturing, reconstruct production chains, and localize technologies that had previously been outside its jurisdiction.
Rostec’s announcement of new ultra-heavy engines to replace residual dependence on Motor Sich indicates Russia’s growing confidence that a vital industrial relationship from the Soviet aerospace era has effectively ended.