Russia has achieved a remarkable level of domestic manufacturing of materials required by its microelectronics industry. 84 percent of the materials used by radio-electronic firms are currently considered to be locally manufactured. But there is a big caveat to that number: almost 90% of those ‘Russian’ goods are themselves produced from imported raw materials and feedstocks.
The data were given by Vadim Yezhlov, head of the Materials Department of the International Research and Technology Center of the Moscow Institute of Electronic Technology (MSTC MIET), during the Microelectronics 2026 symposium. The organization calls these items “conditionally domestic” because the final processing is done in Russia, but the upstream supply chain is strongly dependent on foreign sources.
5,112 Materials Make Up the Supply Chain
The assessment covers 5,112 different materials used in Russia’s radio electronics industry. 84% are domestically manufactured; only 16% of the total is made up of foreign products.
However, the level of localization varies considerably between different segments of the electronics industry.
Passive electronics is the largest category with 4,150 material types. About 86% of these materials are made in Russia. A further 947 positions are in microelectronics, microwave, and power electronics, where the domestic share is lower at around 74%.
Specifically, for microwave and power electronics, the share of domestic products is about 73% of the 618 materials in microelectronics. The localization rate is substantially lower in the technological materials, about 55% of 25 places. In structural materials, the share of domestic products is much greater, at about 95% across 295 positions.
The passive-electronics market also has a mixed picture. Out of 1602 radio-electrotechnical materials, over 77% are of domestic production. The share of domestic technology materials is roughly 55%, and structural materials are about 93%. The list of technological materials has 2442 positions.
These numbers illustrate that “domestic production” does not imply that the entire supply chain is based in Russia.
The Missing Layer Is the Raw Material
The most important weakness is further upstream.
The figures relate to specialized materials for the radio-electronics industry and not to the whole range of industrial chemicals, said the members of MSTC MIET quoted by CNews. At present Russia does not produce domestically many of the raw ingredients and starting components needed to make these specialized products.
The reason is the disruption of industrial supply chains following the demise of the Soviet Union. Many complicated chemical manufacturing facilities have disappeared, industry links have been disrupted, laboratories closed and specialist experience has been lost, says MSTC MIET.
Rebuilding such infrastructure is much more complicated than just putting up another processing unit. To make it economically viable to produce involves research and development, specialized and expensive equipment, highly skilled workers, and, crucially, adequate demand.
Another issue is the relatively small Russian market for some highly specialized commodities. Where a firm begins local production, limited volumes might lead to high unit costs. If demand is not high enough, it is difficult to achieve competitive prices.
This is a classic industrialization problem: the country can produce the finished material at home, yet the material may rely on foreign inputs.
Moscow Is Now Pouring Billions Into Materials
Russia’s electrical engineering development program is an attempt to tackle this more fundamental layer of dependency.
The program is designed to achieve about 70% import substitution of equipment and materials for microelectronics by 2030. The broader initiative has been awarded fiscal funding of almost 240 billion rubles.
In the nearer term, the Industry and Trade Ministry aims to invest 4.68 billion rubles in 2026-2028 on developing and introducing serial production of microelectronics materials. The funding would be through development work as well as further subsidies, the CNews report said, adding that it would comprise 1.6 billion rubles in 2026, 970 million in 2027, and 1.02 billion in 2028.
The target is to generate 98 new materials for the electronics sector by 2028. The initiative envisages mass manufacturing of neutron-transmutation-doped monocrystalline silicon and polished 150 mm wafers, photomasks for projection and contact lithography, silicon-on-insulator structures, and ultrapure mercury.
The concept also provides for the development of an industrial organization and a special catalog of domestic electronic materials.
The Lithography Problem
The importance of this issue becomes particularly clear when looking at semiconductor lithography.
Russia’s push to produce its own lithography equipment isn’t only about the machine itself but also a long list of specialized materials and optical components. One example is monocrystalline calcium fluoride used in the production of optical elements for 193-nanometer excimer lasers used in high-resolution photolithography systems.
A tender for the development of pilot-industrial production of monocrystalline calcium-fluoride ingots in Russia was canceled in December 2025 for 1.6 billion rubles, CNews reported. This material is interesting in lithography systems for semiconductor processes of 90 nm and below.
This episode demonstrates the larger problem: creating a local semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem takes much more than just making chips or even manufacturing lithography tools. It requires the raw ingredients, the optical components, the chemicals, the wafers, the masks, and other inputs that allow those devices to work.
From final assembly to full supply chain self-sufficiency
The 84% percentage is thus a huge step forward in domestic manufacturing but also signals the next stage of Russia’s localization challenge.
Much of the final fabrication of specialist electronics materials has been brought inside the country. The question that remains is how much of the downstream industrial chain can also be brought under domestic control.
Materials have become a distinct emphasis, as shown by recent government financing. But the problem is daunting because many of the missing capabilities are in businesses that require extensive development cycles, specialized equipment, scientific competence, and substantial production numbers.
For Russia’s semiconductor ambitions, the gap is growing between producing a material domestically and having the entire supply chain be domestic. The 84% number speaks much about how far localization has come. The figure of 90% imported raw materials points to where the next battle for technological independence will be.