Russia has reportedly developed a specialised electronic warfare system designed to disrupt Starlink communications in a fundamentally different way from conventional battlefield jammers. The Volna-Kupol-Garant’s main objective is not to overpower a Starlink terminal located on the ground. The communication link at the satellite is reportedly targeted by the system, which reportedly directs powerful radio-frequency interference upward. The objective is to temporarily “blind” a Starlink satellite to terminals that operate beneath it.
The development is critical due to the fact that Starlink has emerged as a critical communications layer for Ukrainian forces, particularly for drones that operate at a significant distance from their operators. It is challenging to engage in conventional electronic warfare against such systems due to the fact that Starlink terminals utilize electronically steered antennas and consistently maintain connections with satellites that transit low Earth orbit.
Why attacking the ground terminal is difficult
Traditional electronic warfare typically involves the interference of the receiver or transmitter on the ground. However, in the case of a drone that uses Starlink, the terminal is in motion, its antenna is oriented toward the sky, and the communication architecture is engineered to preserve connectivity in the event of shifting satellite positions.
Therefore, a jammer that is positioned on the ground is confronted with a challenging problem. It must generate an adequate amount of interference at the terminal’s location while simultaneously circumventing the directional antenna of the terminal and the adaptive communications architecture of Starlink.
The opposite approach is purportedly taken by Volna-Kupol-Garant. Rather than attempting to overwhelm individual terminals, it aims to disrupt the uplink from those terminals to the satellite.
A concentrated signal is reportedly transmitted by the system to a Starlink spacecraft that is passing overhead. The satellite may find it challenging or impossible to decode legitimate signals from terminals beneath the spacecraft if the interference is sufficiently severe at the receiving antenna.
The distinction is crucial: the system is not depicted as destroying a satellite. It is essentially an attempt to temporarily render the satellite unable to hear its customers.
Eight frequency channels and a phased-array architecture
Volna-Kupol-Garant operates in the 14–14.5 GHz region, which is associated with Starlink’s terminal-to-satellite communications, according to the information associated with the system. The system reportedly divides its interference capability across eight channels, enabling it to address multiple portions of the relevant spectrum.
The antennas are configured to generate a directional beam. The system’s capacity to monitor a satellite’s movement and preserve the necessary geometry as the spacecraft traverses the sky is facilitated by the use of multiple antennas.
This also explains why the system is significantly more advanced than a traditional battlefield jammer. The generation of sufficient effective interference to reach a spacecraft hundreds of kilometers above Earth necessitates a significant increase in antenna gain and the meticulous regulation of radiation.
The effective coverage size is approximately 20 square kilometers, as reported. The system is designed to disrupt Starlink connectivity in the vicinity of the targeted satellite as it passes overhead.
The satellite is “stunned,” not “destroyed”
Volna-Kupol-Garant is not an anti-satellite weapon in the traditional physical sense, which is one of its most significant qualifications.
According to reports, the system does not permanently disable or damage a Starlink spacecraft. Rather, it aims to temporarily disrupt a specific satellite as it traverses the operating area of the system.
Once the satellite moves away, another spacecraft can potentially provide service.
This makes the system a form of localised counterspace electronic warfare rather than a traditional kinetic anti-satellite weapon.
This method is also compatible with the demands of the battlefield. The entire Starlink constellation does not necessarily need to be disabled by Russia. A temporary denial of Starlink connectivity to a relatively small area that contains a military base, logistics center, or other sensitive facility may be sufficient to complicate drone operations.
The system’s major weakness
The same characteristic that renders Volna-Kupol-Garant so effective also creates a significant vulnerability.
A high-power electronic warfare system has to radiate substantial amounts of energy. That creates the possibility of electronic intelligence systems detecting it. The antenna structures and associated vehicles can become high-value targets once their location is determined.
This creates a technological race. Russia aims to create a local electronic shield that will protect against Starlink-enabled drones, while Ukraine aims to identify and destroy the systems that are producing the shield.
Therefore, the system is confronted with a fundamental battlefield trade-off: the more power it expends to communicate with a satellite, the more likely it is for an adversary to detect its emissions.
Volna is not Russia’s only counter-Starlink system
For several years, Russia has been conducting research on methods to disrupt Starlink. The Tobol system received international attention following reports that Russia had conducted an experiment with it against the Starlink.
However, the exact capabilities and operating methods of Tobol are less certain in open sources than those of Volna-Kupol-Garant. Satellite communications interference and other forms of electronic warfare have been linked to the system.
Kalinka, another system, is predominantly responsible for the detection and localization of Starlink terminals. This renders it potentially complementary to a jammer. Terminal location can assist in the identification of areas where Starlink is being used and may facilitate targeting operations.
Additionally, there are additional Russian electronic warfare systems that are intended to disrupt satellite navigation and communications. Collectively, these systems indicate that Moscow is investing in a more comprehensive counter-space electronic warfare capability, rather than relying on a singular Starlink jammer.
What about China and the United States?
There are comparable Western systems in the broader electronic-warfare and high-power-microwave field; however, publicly documented systems do not appear to provide an exact equivalent to Volna-Kupol-Garant’s reported mission.
For instance, the American Leonidas uses high-power microwave technology to combat electronic systems, particularly drones. In contrast to disrupting the uplink of a communications satellite, its objective is to defeat the electronics of the target.
China has investigated various strategies for combating Starlink. Distributed networks of airborne jammers, which are transported by drones, balloons, or other platforms, have been modeled by Chinese researchers. By locating numerous jammers at precisely calculated distances, such systems have the potential to establish an electromagnetic shield that covers a significant area.
Nevertheless, the modeling of a system and the deployment of an operational battlefield capability are two distinct processes. The existence of a Chinese system that is directly equivalent to Volna-Kupol-Garant is not established by publicly available information.
During periods of severe communications restrictions, Iran has also been reported to have experienced Starlink interference. However, the operational system that Iran possesses is not identical to the Russian complex, as evidenced by publicly available information.
A new dimension of electronic warfare
Volna-Kupol-Garant demonstrates that the electronic warfare battlefield is expanding beyond the mere disruption of radios, GPS receivers, and drone-control frequencies.
The electronic battlefield is increasingly incorporating satellites.
Whether Volna-Kupol-Garant can consistently block Starlink’s ever-changing network remains an open question. While electronic warfare systems must consistently adjust to these changes, Starlink has the ability to modify frequencies, routing, satellite configurations, and software.
However, the emergence of systems like Volna-Kupol-Garant suggests a more extensive transformation in contemporary warfare. Electronic warfare is progressing from the battlefield to the space-based infrastructure that enables it, as satellite internet is incorporated into military communications and drone operations.