The Indo-US trade deal has been presented as a landmark sign that India and the United States have finally aligned their economic and strategic trajectories. Official briefings emphasise partnership, shared democratic values, and mutual economic gain. Yet trade agreements are rarely what their press releases claim. They are instruments of power, shaped by relative leverage, domestic political compulsions, and long-term strategic intent.
The current Indo-US trade understanding reveals a defining feature: an asymmetry of commitments that could affect long-term strategic autonomy. India is being asked to open markets, absorb adjustment costs, and signal strategic alignment, which may affect its future independence. The United States secures commercial access and supply certainty while retaining regulatory discretion and strategic ambiguity. The imbalance, though subtle in individual clauses, accumulates over time and warrants careful consideration by policymakers.
Beyond the Headline Trade Numbers
At first glance, the numbers appear benign. In 2024–25, bilateral trade stood at approximately USD 190–195 billion. India exported around USD 115–120 billion worth of goods and services to the US, while American exports to India were roughly USD 85–90 billion. On the surface, India enjoys a surplus, and government statements have been quick to highlight this.
However, trade balances are a rear-view mirror. They tell us little about future exposure. What matters in a trade agreement is not where trade stands today, but who commits to opening what, under what rules, and at what cost.
Here, the asymmetry becomes clear.
India has committed, explicitly in some areas and implicitly in others, to progressively liberalising agriculture, energy imports, industrial goods, digital trade, and defence procurement. Taken together, these commitments could unlock USD 250–300 billion in the Indian domestic market over the next decade. By contrast, the realistic incremental access offered by the United States is largely confined to IT services, pharmaceuticals, and limited professional mobility, and amounts to USD 40–50 billion at best. It remains subject to regulatory interpretation and domestic political cycles in Washington. This disparity underscores the need for reciprocity to build confidence in negotiations.
In percentage terms, India is committing to liberalise approximately 12–15% of its GDP-linked consumption and procurement space. The United States is offering access equivalent to about 2–3% of its tightly regulated domestic market. This is not symmetry; it is a structural imbalance.
Market Access or Market Capture?
Despite repeated references to a “strategic partnership,” the deal suggests that Washington’s primary focus is on unlocking the Indian market for US goods and energy, rather than pursuing co-development or reciprocal economic integration.
This distinction matters. Market access implies mutual opening, fostering reciprocal growth. Market capture, however, means that one side gains durable entry into the other’s consumption base without facing equivalent competition, risking long-term dominance. Addressing this concern is vital to ensure that the trade agreement promotes genuine, balanced economic integration rather than asymmetric market capture.
In agriculture, India faces pressure to align with sanitary and phytosanitary standards, reduce tariff protection over time, and accommodate imports that directly compete with small and marginal farmers. The United States, meanwhile, maintains an extensive system of farm subsidies, crop insurance, and non-tariff barriers. Indian farmers are exposed to global competition without comparable state support, while American farmers are insulated by design.
In manufacturing and defence, American capital goods, platforms, and systems gain easier access to a price-sensitive Indian market. By contrast, Indian firms receive no binding guarantees of manufacturing access, technology sharing, or assured integration into US defence supply chains.
This is not reciprocal liberalisation. It is an asymmetric market opening.
Energy Commitments: Certainty for One Side, Rigidity for the Other
Energy is often portrayed as a neutral area of cooperation. In practice, it is one of the most asymmetric elements of the deal. India’s commitment to expand long-term imports of US crude oil and LNG is framed as diversification away from unstable suppliers. Yet US energy is neither the cheapest nor the most flexible option. Long-term offtake agreements reduce India’s ability to arbitrage between suppliers, expose it to higher landed costs, and constrain policy flexibility during geopolitical or price shocks.
For the United States, the benefits are clear: a guaranteed long-term buyer, stable export revenue, and geopolitical leverage embedded in commercial contracts. For India, the risks—price volatility, reduced optionality, and strategic dependence—are borne almost entirely domestically.
The asymmetry lies not in the volume of trade but in who bears the risk.
Rules, Standards, and the Cost of Compliance
Modern trade agreements are less about tariffs and more about rules. Here, too, the imbalance is evident.
India is nudged toward alignment with US-led standards in digital trade, intellectual property enforcement, environmental compliance, and cross-border data flows. These standards are often presented as neutral or global best practice. In reality, they reflect the regulatory ecosystem of advanced economies.
For India, adjustment costs are substantial—particularly for MSMEs, startups, and farmers who lack the capital buffers to absorb sudden regulatory shifts. Recognising these challenges can promote a sense of shared responsibility and encourage collaborative solutions in future negotiations.
In effect, rule-making authority remains concentrated with one side, while rule-taking responsibility rests with the other. This constrains India’s future industrial policy space, even as it assumes the political responsibility for implementation failures.
Strategic Alignment Without Strategic Assurance
Perhaps the most consequential asymmetry lies outside economics. India’s concessions are widely interpreted by allies and adversaries alike as a signal of strategic alignment with Washington, especially in the context of China. Yet the trade agreement offers no binding security guarantees, no assured crisis-time support, and no automatic technology transfers at scale.
The United States retains strategic ambiguity. India signals strategic intent.
This mirrors a recurring pattern in international politics: alignment is encouraged, but assurance is Withheld. The burden of signalling falls on the rising power; the benefits of flexibility accrue to the established power.
The Numbers at a Glance
Asymmetry in Market Access and Commitments: India vs. the United States
| Dimension | India | United States |
| Current bilateral trade | USD 190–195 bn | USD 190–195 bn |
| Goods exports (2024–25) | USD 115–120 bn to the US | USD 85–90 bn to India |
| Future market opening (10 yrs) | USD 250–300 bn exposure | USD 40–50 bn access |
| GDP exposure | 12–15% | 2–3% |
| Energy trade | Long-term import commitments | Guaranteed export market |
| Agriculture | Gradual exposure, limited subsidies | Strong subsidies retained |
| Standards & regulation | High compliance cost | Low adjustment cost |
| Strategic assurance | Alignment signal | No binding guarantees |
The asymmetry is not rhetorical. It is measurable.
The Psychological Dimension
There is also a less tangible but equally important imbalance: negotiating psychology.
India often approaches Western trade negotiations from a position of perceived vulnerability, driven by fear of exclusion from global supply chains, capital flows, and technology ecosystems. The United States negotiates from a position of choice. This difference shapes outcomes more than any single clause.
Until India negotiates with confidence in its domestic market size, demographic dividend, and geopolitical indispensability, asymmetry will persist—regardless of the administration in Washington.
A Familiar Historical Pattern
India has encountered this dynamic before. In the 1960s, dependence on external food supplies translated into political leverage and policy constraints. What altered India’s trajectory was not better negotiated terms but structural self-reliance—in food, industry, and defence.
Trade agreements should complement that autonomy, not dilute it.
Conclusion: Reciprocity Is the Measure of Partnership
The Indo-US relationship matters. Economic engagement is necessary. But a partnership does not require disproportionate concession.
Asymmetry in power is a fact of the international system. Asymmetry in commitments is a choice.
If India wishes to avoid repeating historical patterns, it must recalibrate its negotiating posture: treat access to its market as a strategic asset, insist on reciprocity, and preserve policy space for domestic development.
A confident India does not reject trade; It improves its terms.