After eight years of signing the historic agreement with Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, Iran has finally taken a major move toward ratifying the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. The Iranian government has reintroduced the long-delayed issue of ratification to the forefront of the country’s domestic and regional politics by submitting the convention to parliament.
The move raises a crucial question: will Iran actually ratify the Caspian Convention, or will opposition inside the country once again prevent the agreement from taking effect?
Eight Years After the Aktau Agreement
The leaders of the five Caspian littoral states signed the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in Aktau, Kazakhstan, on August 12, 2018. The agreement was the result of over two decades of negotiations that followed the Soviet Union’s disintegration and the emergence of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan as independent Caspian states.
The convention established a comprehensive legal framework for economic activity, environmental preservation, security, fishing, and navigation in the Caspian. It also confirmed that the five littoral states should resolve Caspian-related issues and that the presence of external military powers should be limited.
Nevertheless, the agreement did not resolve all disputes. The exact delimitation of the seabed between the countries remains the subject of separate agreements, which is one of the most sensitive issues. This has been of particular significance to Iran, as Tehran has historically harbored apprehensions regarding the extent of its potential sector and its access to offshore resources.
Why Iran Delayed Ratification
Iran’s hesitation has largely been connected to the question of its share of the Caspian Sea.
For years, certain Iranian political circles have maintained that Tehran should be granted 20% of the Caspian Sea, while others have gone further and asserted that Iran historically held the right to half of the sea. Whenever the convention has been the subject of discussion, those arguments have been repeatedly brought up.
However, Iranian former diplomat Mohsen Pakayin has refuted the notion that Iran has a documented legal claim to 50% of the Caspian Sea. He maintains that there is no historical treaty that established such a division, even during the Soviet era.
The convention does not just divide the Caspian into five equal 20-percent sectors. Rather, it establishes principles for maritime zones and defers significant seabed delimitation concerns to agreements between the relevant states. This distinction is essential because the ultimate maritime boundaries of Iran would not be automatically determined upon ratification.
Why Tehran Is Moving Now
The timing of Iran’s decision is significant.
Iranian officials have linked the move to the changing security environment around the Caspian. Esmaeil Baghaei, the spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry, has contended that the ratification of the agreement would establish a more transparent legal framework among the five littoral states and would prevent the influence of external powers.
Tehran has experienced an increase in the significance of security concerns. Iran is interested in the Caspian region remaining a controlled regional space that is free of military activity by non-littoral powers.
Ratification could therefore strengthen Iran’s legal position in a changing regional security environment. Additionally, it would eliminate the most major remaining barrier to the convention’s implementation.
The agreement has been ratified by Russia and the other Caspian republics. In the ratification procedure, Iran has remained the critical missing piece.
Opposition within Iran
However, ratification is not a certainty.
A campaign against the convention has been initiated by hardline political groups and certain Iranian commentators. Their objections include concerns about Iran’s maritime rights, the unresolved seabed question, possible future pipelines across the Caspian seabed and the broader geopolitical consequences of the agreement.
Some opponents contend that ratification could erode Iran’s bargaining power in relation to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Others associate the matter with the Zangezur Corridor, Iran’s apprehensions regarding regional transportation routes, and Azerbaijan’s expanding strategic partnership with Turkey.
The issue has therefore become much larger than a technical maritime treaty. It is associated with the country’s broader geopolitical position, relations with Azerbaijan, and national sovereignty for certain Iranian political factions.
The parliamentary debate is of particular significance due to the involvement of conservative and IRGC-linked media. Although the Iranian government may endorse ratification, it must still surmount domestic political opposition.
What Ratification Would Mean for the Caspian
If parliament approves the convention, the consequences could be significant.
First, it would provide the Caspian states with a more complete legal framework for cooperation. Second, it would strengthen the principle that the security arrangements of the sea are determined by the five littoral countries, rather than external powers.
Third, the ratification of the agreement could foster a more extensive economic partnership that encompasses energy, transportation, ports, and shipping. The Caspian is becoming increasingly significant as a connection between the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Iran, and Russia.
This could also serve as an additional incentive for Iran to mitigate the uncertainty that surrounds its northern maritime frontier, thus complementing the broader development of the International North-South Transport Corridor.
Simultaneously, ratification would not resolve each territorial dispute in a magical manner. Seabed boundaries and offshore resources may continue to be the subject of separate negotiations.
Therefore, will Iran ratify it?
The response is becoming more likely to be affirmative; however, it may not occur without political controversy or in a timely manner.
Tehran has transitioned the convention from diplomatic discourse to the formal parliamentary process, which is the most compelling indication. The government has publicly argued that ratification is essential for Iran’s security and regional interests and has granted the bill urgent status.
This represents a major departure from the eight-year period of uncertainty that preceded it.
However, it is important to not underestimate the domestic opposition. In Iran, the Caspian question is imbued with significant symbolic significance, and any indication that Tehran is ceding maritime territory could potentially incite opposition.
Consequently, instead of immediate approval, the most probable result is the eventual ratification following a vigorous political debate. Tehran has compelling strategic reasons to finalize the process: it would integrate Iran into the legal framework that governs the Caspian, fortify regional security arrangements, and eradicate the uncertainty that has pervaded the convention since 2018.
However, the ultimate conflict will now transpire within Iran’s parliament.
Eight years ago, the Caspian Convention was signed to resolve one of the most enduring maritime disputes in Eurasia. Tehran may now be prepared to convert that diplomatic agreement into law, as evidenced by its decision to present it to legislators. Whether the Caspian receives the legal framework envisioned at Aktau or enters another chapter will depend on its ability to overcome domestic opposition.