The purpose of a technology trial should be to evaluate the solution, not the size of the supplier’s bank account
India wants access to the world’s most advanced technologies. It wants to strengthen national security, accelerate local manufacturing, reduce dependence on foreign suppliers and build globally competitive capabilities under Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat.
These are legitimate and strategically important ambitions.
Yet one familiar procurement practice may be working against them.
NCNC is widely used in engagements involving government, defence, security and major corporations. Under this model, the technology provider is expected to finance the demonstration or trial, while the prospective customer pays nothing and makes no commitment to purchase.
The logic is understandable.
Government organisations receive countless proposals from companies claiming to possess revolutionary technologies. Some are genuine. Others are immature, untested or supported mainly by impressive presentations.
A public customer must protect taxpayers’ money. It must avoid paying for weak solutions and ensure that only serious vendors reach the evaluation stage.
The problem is not the existence of NCNC.
The problem is its blanket application.
When NCNC is applied in the same way to a multinational corporation and a five-person startup, it stops being only a mechanism for testing technology. It becomes a test of financial endurance.
That is not the same thing.
Deep Pockets Do Not Mean Better Technology
Consider a realistic case.
A large Indian company is evaluating an Israeli startup that has developed a breakthrough solution. The startup employs no more than five people. Almost all of its money has been invested in research and development. Its founders may have worked for years without drawing salaries because every available dollar or shekel was directed toward engineering, testing and intellectual property.
The company may not have a marketing department, an international logistics network, a legal division, or a budget for long, expensive overseas trials.
It may have exceptional technology.
It may possess a capability that larger corporations failed to develop. It may have solved a highly specialised operational problem through years of experimentation, unique algorithms, military experience or original engineering.
The fact that such a company cannot finance an open-ended NCNC process says little about the quality of its technology.
It does not prove that the company is unserious.
It does not prove that it lacks commitment to the Indian market.
It proves only that its limited resources were invested in development rather than in corporate overhead.
When the company is judged by its ability to finance the trial, the customer is not evaluating the technology.
It is evaluating the founders’ bank accounts.
That is the wrong metric.
No Cost Applies Only to One Side
A technological demonstration is rarely cost-free.
The startup may need to allocate one of its few prototypes, obtain export approvals, manage import procedures, pay for shipping, insurance, customs-related expenses, storage, local transportation and security.
It may need to send engineers to India and finance flights, accommodation, transport and weeks of technical work.
It may also be required to adapt the system to Indian terrain, climate, communications, networks, platforms, operational procedures or cybersecurity standards.
These are not always minor adjustments.
In some cases, they amount to customer-specific development.
The financial risk becomes even greater when the trial has no fixed timetable.
Testing may be postponed. Requirements may change. Decision makers may be replaced. The process may move between departments or organisations. A budget may disappear after months of work.
The customer loses little.
The startup may lose most of its annual operating budget.
For a large defence corporation, such expenditure may be classified as business development.
For a small company, it may be an existential risk.
The Strongest Balance Sheet Is Not Always the Best Solution
A major corporation can remain in a procurement process for years. It can finance repeated demonstrations, maintain teams on the ground and absorb delays.
A smaller company with a superior technology may be forced to withdraw.
The result is paradoxical.
The company with the less advanced solution survives because it has money.
The company with the better solution disappears because it cannot finance the evaluation.
The system then selects the financially strongest supplier, not necessarily the technologically strongest one.
In ordinary commercial procurement, this may lead to an inefficient purchase.
In defence, intelligence, border security, counter-drone systems, tunnel detection, artificial intelligence, and cyber or electronic warfare, it can lead to a strategic mistake.
The most disruptive technologies often come from small and highly specialised teams. They do not always emerge from corporations with thousands of employees.
If the entry conditions favour only large companies, India may never see some of the solutions it needs most.
India May Save the Trial Cost and Lose the Technology
Technology companies do not wait indefinitely.
A startup unable to finance an Indian trial may turn to the Gulf, Europe, East Asia, or the United States, where a government or industrial partner is prepared to support a pilot, share costs, or commit to a decision timeline.
Once another country funds the evaluation, establishes a partnership or launches local production, India may lose more than one transaction.
It may lose early access to the technology.
It may lose the opportunity to manufacture it locally.
It may lose export potential, professional employment and access to intellectual property.
Years later, India may be required to purchase the same technology at a much higher price after it has already been commercialised elsewhere.
That is not financial discipline.
It is a strategic loss disguised as savings.
The Opportunity Lies in Indian Scale and Israeli Innovation
A small Israeli technology company and a major Indian corporation should not be viewed as unequal parties.
They should be viewed as complementary ones.
The startup can contribute innovation, specialised expertise, engineering flexibility, rapid decision-making, and a solution developed through years of focused research.
The Indian corporation can contribute market access, industrial capacity, skilled manpower, logistics, regulatory support, government relationships, maintenance, integration, and large-scale manufacturing.
Together, they can create something neither side could achieve alone.
The Indian company can avoid years of costly research and development by partnering with a team that has already solved the core technological problem.
The startup can gain the industrial platform, resources and market access it lacks.
The partnership can lead to local manufacturing, adaptation to Indian requirements, knowledge transfer, employment, export opportunities and faster market entry.
This is not charity.
It is a strategic commercial exchange.
The startup brings what the large corporation may lack: the breakthrough.
The corporation provides what the startup may lack: scale.
This type of cooperation should sit at the heart of Make in India.
The objective should not be to force a small technology company to behave like a global conglomerate before it is allowed to enter the market.
The objective should be to connect innovation with Indian industrial power.
Partnership Is Better than a Survival Test
Neither Indian corporations nor government agencies should finance every company that claims to possess unique technology.
Strict screening remains essential.
The technology should be examined using previous test results, laboratory reports, customer references, intellectual property reviews, simulations, video evidence, and technical due diligence.
Only companies that pass serious preliminary evaluation should proceed to a physical trial.
But once a solution has demonstrated genuine potential, the evaluation model should become more balanced.
The Indian side could provide the trial site, local logistics, infrastructure, regulatory assistance, and a portion of the operational costs.
The startup could provide the system, engineers, know-how, and agreed technical adaptations.
A limited pilot fee could be deducted from the future contract if procurement proceeds.
This would ensure that neither side carries the entire risk.
It would also demonstrate mutual commitment.
NCNC Should Be Selective, Not Automatic
NCNC remains appropriate in certain cases.
It may be reasonable when dealing with large suppliers, mature off-the-shelf products, commercially established systems, or short, inexpensive demonstrations.
It becomes far less reasonable when applied to a small startup, a rare prototype, a long operational trial or a technology that requires significant customer-specific development.
A proper evaluation framework should distinguish between a large corporation and a startup, between a product demonstration and a development programme, and between a routine commercial offering and a technology with no direct alternative.
It should also define the trial period, success criteria, responsibilities, decision timetable, and intellectual property protection before the process begins.
Without these safeguards, NCNC becomes less a procurement tool and more a convenient mechanism for transferring all cost and risk to the supplier.
Test the Technology, Not the Bank Account
India does not need to choose between protecting public money and attracting innovation.
It can do both.
It can conduct rigorous technical screening, demand evidence, reject weak proposals and still create a fairer path for small companies with exceptional technologies.
A five-person startup with no spare cash, whose founders have never taken salaries because every resource was invested in development, is not necessarily a weak company.
It may be exactly the company holding the solution India needs.
The purpose of a trial should be to determine whether the technology works, whether it meets the operational requirement and whether it can be scaled with an Indian partner.
It should not determine which supplier can afford to lose the most money during the evaluation process.
NCNC should remain a useful instrument.
It should not become a doctrine.
India’s strategic objective must be to identify and secure the best technologies available, not merely those backed by the deepest pockets.