A few days after the attempted terrorist attack on a Flydubai flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv, emerging details demand a closer look at the flight’s fortunate outcome. The Indian captain and the Israeli passengers who acted so courageously deserve our deepest gratitude. But when saving an aircraft depends on a wounded pilot’s ability to keep fighting and passengers’ willingness to come to his aid, the aviation industry must ask how such a crisis became possible and what will prevent another.
Initial speculation focused on whether a hostile state had organised the attack. The possibility of outside direction still requires investigation, and there is no basis for declaring that question settled. The Attorney General of the United Arab Emirates has said that the investigation points to an attempted act of terrorism and that inquiries into motives and connections are continuing. The possibility that a crew member acted on his own is also deeply troubling. It raises an urgent question: how can someone entrusted with such authority become a threat to the aircraft in his care?
Recent reports in Israel suggest that the Omani copilot intended to crash the aircraft at Ben Gurion Airport, with one report identifying the passenger terminal as the target. These details have been attributed to an investigation that remains incomplete and must be treated accordingly. If confirmed, their implications are horrifying. Alongside passengers and crew, large numbers of people on the ground could have been at risk in an area where thousands of travellers, visitors, and airport workers may be present.
According to those reports, the attack began while the aircraft was over Jordan. The suspicion is that the copilot intended to kill the captain and continue a flight that appeared routine until it was close to its destination. The danger lies in the gap between events inside the cockpit and what controllers can understand in real time. An aircraft may be under surveillance while the identity and intentions of the person controlling it remain uncertain.
The reinforced cockpit door is designed to prevent unauthorised entry. It is an essential element of aviation security, yet when the threat is already inside, the same protection can delay those trying to help. Procedures and mechanisms for authorised access vary by aircraft. Their effectiveness must be examined when someone inside deliberately blocks entry and the crew outside knows that passengers’ lives are in danger.
This is where the Indian captain’s actions proved decisive. According to his account, after being injured in the attack, he managed to make a further effort and open the door. That allowed passengers to enter and help overpower the attacker. Witness accounts also describe other pilots on board helping to regain control and land the aircraft. The wounded captain preserved the chance to save the flight at the moment it was almost lost.
During the incident, the aircraft’s transponder also transmitted code 7500, the recognised signal for hijacking or unlawful interference. It alerts air traffic control to a threat to the aircraft. The earlier controllers understand that control of an aircraft is in jeopardy, the more time they have to respond. Establishing the sequence of events and the timing of those alerts must be central to the investigation.
Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the possibility of an airliner being used to cause mass casualties has also required military preparedness. A hijacking alert may prompt fighter aircraft to be scrambled to identify, escort, or redirect the plane. Code 7500 is not, however, an automatic order to shoot it down. The response depends on the assessed threat and the authority and procedures that apply in the country concerned.
If a civilian aircraft is about to strike a population centre or a sensitive installation, the competent authorities may have to consider force to protect people on the ground. It is an appalling decision that also concerns innocent lives aboard the aircraft. It may have to be made with very little time and incomplete information. I do not wish to imagine the moment when someone must take that decision. Effective prevention must do everything possible to reduce the likelihood of it becoming necessary.
Even without a hijacking code, surveillance and control systems remain in place. It would therefore be wrong to assume that nobody would have noticed the danger. Yet every delay in understanding events inside the cockpit reduces the time available to act. Investigators must examine the sequence of alerts and how information moved between the crew, air traffic control, and security authorities.
The decision to divert to Tabuk in Saudi Arabia also demands an explanation. Why did the aircraft turn towards Tabuk rather than land in Jordan or continue to Israel? Who made that decision, at what stage, and what was the condition of the aircraft? With an injured captain needing treatment and passengers still at risk, it matters whether another option could have allowed a safe landing sooner.
Choosing an airport for an emergency landing depends on the aircraft’s condition, approach conditions, and the airport’s ability to respond. Geography alone cannot explain the decision. There has also been a report that Jordan and Saudi Arabia initially refused permission to land. These claims must be checked against communication recordings and air traffic control records. Investigators should establish whether Tabuk was the crew’s choice, the result of instructions received, or the consequence of permission being withheld elsewhere.
Another troubling question arises from passenger accounts that some crew members asked them to untie the copilot after he had been overpowered. Why seek the release of a man who had just attacked the captain and, according to published investigative findings, tried to seize control of the aircraft? Did they fail to understand the seriousness of the situation? Were they concerned that he might be harmed? What exactly did they ask passengers to do, and on what procedure or judgement did they rely?
I find it difficult to believe that crew members collaborated with the attacker. Nevertheless, that possibility must be examined alongside other explanations. Accounts of requests to release him do not prove complicity, and a full inquiry must also hear the crew’s version. Investigators need to establish who said what, whether the request was repeated, and what those speaking knew at the time. Passengers who fought for their lives deserve a clear answer.
Aviation is already familiar with threats from within. The Germanwings disaster in 2015 prompted scrutiny of cockpit staffing and safeguards against deliberate action by someone inside. This incident requires an assessment of how those safeguards work when two pilots are present and one attacks the other. Having another person in the cockpit does not guarantee that an assault can be prevented or help summoned in time.
The scrutiny must begin before takeoff. Airlines and the relevant authorities should examine the quality of background checks and the scope for sharing relevant security information between employers and countries. If an organisation had significant concerns about a crew member, investigators must establish whether those concerns reached the next employer. Periodic assessments and reliable reporting channels are also needed throughout employment. Such measures must rest on substantiated information about individuals and their conduct while protecting crew members’ rights.
Warning systems, cockpit access procedures, and crew training for an attack from within also require professional review. Making a cockpit easier to enter could weaken protection against another threat, so every proposed change needs safety and security testing. Training must address situations in which the person entrusted with protecting the aircraft becomes the source of danger. It should establish whether other crew members can recognise what is happening and respond within their authority.
For India, this incident is a source of justified pride. An Indian captain fought for the lives of passengers, many of them Israeli, while his own life was at risk. Beyond recognition of his courage, there is a public interest here for India and every country whose citizens depend on international air travel. Background checks, crew training, and information sharing must meet dependable standards even when a flight crosses several national systems of oversight.
Although the attacker’s brutal mission was thwarted through courage and extraordinary good fortune, he could still claim a political success if the incident obstructs closer relations between Israel and Oman. The opportunity for dialogue, and the hope of eventual Omani participation in the Abraham Accords, must be kept alive.
Extremists must never be allowed to decide whether two peoples can benefit from peace. The effort to bring Israel and Oman closer should continue, because the potential gains of cooperation belong to their citizens. Allowing a terrorist attack to dictate that policy would give its perpetrator an influence that no responsible government should grant him.
I am confident that Oman and the UAE will reject acts of this kind unequivocally and do everything within their power to prevent a repetition. The response should reinforce aviation security and the political will to pursue dialogue. A terrorist’s nationality must never become a reason to abandon the possibility of a better relationship between two nations.
Reports quoting a senior UAE official suggest that a death sentence is likely to be sought against the copilot. The statements reflect a determination to punish the attempted terrorist attack severely, and rightly so. But the investigation and legal proceedings are not yet complete. Those statements must not be mistaken for a sentence already handed down.
If he is convicted, I would consider imprisonment for the rest of his life instead. A man who intended to die while killing large numbers of innocent people may not view death as the punishment the public imagines. A lifetime in prison would force him to bear responsibility for his actions day after day. I am confident that the Emirati authorities can hold him under strict security and close supervision, within the law, and prevent him from ever endangering others again.
I pray for the heroic captain’s full and speedy recovery and honour the passengers and crew members who helped save lives. The investigation must continue until it establishes how the attack was planned and where the safeguards failed. Its findings must produce changes whose effectiveness can be tested in practice. No airline can plan for the safety of its passengers on the assumption that a wounded pilot will always manage to open a door or that a brave passenger will step in at the right moment.
On the next flight, heroism may not be enough. Luck cannot become an operating procedure.