The closing months of 2026 are revealing a world in transition: not a sudden collapse of the old order, but a visible loosening of its bolts. A regional gathering in Tehran, bringing Iran together with Pakistan, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, would once have been dismissed as diplomatically improbable. Today, it reads as a symptom of the Middle East recalibrating its dependence on Washington. Meanwhile, Israel’s inconclusive election, Likud’s allegations of foreign interference, and a US midterm environment in which Democrats are strong favourites to retake the House and possibly the Senate are eroding the predictability that American allies once took for granted.
Against this backdrop, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Reliance’s Jamnagar refinery, where he urged India to process more Venezuelan crude, reveals another layer of the churn: Washington is no longer merely asking India to choose sides; it is asking India to help stabilise global energy markets. The implications are global, regional, and distinctly Indian.
Global Implications
The first global implication is the erosion of certainty. For three decades after the Cold War, much of the world organised its foreign policy around an assumption: the United States would remain the indispensable security guarantor, the dollar-centred financial system would remain stable, and American power would ultimately protect global energy flows. That assumption has not disappeared, but it is no longer taken for granted.
The Tehran meeting matters because it suggests that regional powers are preparing for a world in which they must manage security, trade, and energy among themselves. Iran hosting Pakistan, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE would not imply a formally Iranian-led bloc. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain wary of Tehran; Pakistan has its own strategic anxieties; and Türkiye is pursuing an increasingly independent regional agenda. But the very fact that such a conversation is happening in Tehran signals that the region is seeking a native security architecture rather than waiting for instructions from Washington.
This has three consequences.
First, it accelerates multipolarity. The world is moving from a system dominated by a single military and financial power to a more fluid arrangement in which the United States, China, Russia, regional middle powers, and energy-producing states negotiate from positions of partial strength. This does not mean American decline in absolute terms; the US remains unmatched in global military reach, technology, and alliance networks. It means American power is becoming more conditional, more costly to deploy, and more politically constrained at home. It also increases the premium on energy security. Rubio’s own framing in India made the connection explicit: wars involving Iran and Yemen, threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, and high oil prices have made diversified crude supplies a strategic necessity. If the Persian Gulf becomes less predictable, consumers in Europe, Asia, and Africa will face inflationary pressure, while producers will gain bargaining power.
Third, it weakens sanctions’ credibility as an instrument of statecraft. The US push for Venezuelan crude after years in which Venezuelan oil was treated as politically toxic shows that strategic necessity can override ideological consistency. Washington’s interest in finding markets for Venezuelan oil, including through Indian refining capacity, suggests that energy supply is now being treated as a geopolitical stabiliser. That is pragmatic, but it also teaches other states an uncomfortable lesson: sanctions are powerful, but not permanent; today’s pariah crude can become tomorrow’s emergency supply.
The bigger global risk is not war by design but instability by accumulation. A contested Israeli political transition, a polarised United States, an assertive Iran, a nervous Gulf, a volatile Red Sea and a strained global oil market can interact in ways no single capital can fully control. The world is entering a period when crises are less likely to be resolved by hegemonic management and more likely to be managed imperfectly by coalitions of convenience.
The Middle East and US Power Projection
The Tehran meeting is the most symbolically significant development in the Middle East. It does not necessarily mean Iran has won the region; rather, it signals that Iran has become unavoidable.
For decades, US strategy in the Gulf rested on a simple bargain: American security guarantees in exchange for energy access, basing rights, and alignment against Iran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE accepted this bargain because Iran was seen as the principal threat and because Washington could project power into the region with unmatched speed. But that bargain is under strain.
The meeting in Tehran suggests that Gulf states are hedging. They are not abandoning the United States, but they are building diplomatic insurance. If Washington’s commitment becomes uncertain due to domestic polarisation, electoral turnover, fiscal fatigue, or reluctance to entangle itself in another Middle Eastern war, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Ankara, and Islamabad have reason to talk directly to Tehran.
This is not a sign of Iranian ideological triumph. It signals regional pragmatism. Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not trust Iran’s regional network, its proxies, or its nuclear ambitions. Yet they cannot ignore the reality that Iran sits across the Gulf, influences events in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and can threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Dialogue with Tehran is therefore not surrender; it is risk management.
The Israeli election compounds uncertainty. Final results indicate that Netanyahu’s bloc lost its majority, while the opposition and Arab-led parties together command more than the 61 seats needed for a Knesset majority. Likud has alleged foreign interference and electoral fraud, prompting a Shin Bet inquiry, though Israeli authorities have publicly disputed or challenged the evidentiary basis of those claims. Whether or not the allegations prove true, their political effect is corrosive: they deepen distrust in institutions, complicate coalition formation, and could produce either a fragile government or another election in the region. An unstable Israel is not merely an internal Israeli matter. It affects deterrence vis-à-vis Iran, the tempo of operations against Iranian-aligned groups, prospects for a Palestinian political settlement, and Gulf states’ confidence in Western security commitments. A coalition government in Jerusalem may be cautious and internally divided; a re-election could prolong uncertainty; and allegations of foreign interference—especially claims involving Qatar and Türkiye—could poison relations with neighbours even if unsubstantiated.
The loss of US power projection should be understood carefully. It does not mean American aircraft carriers will vanish from the region or that US bases will close overnight. It means the political willingness to use power is diminishing relative to the risks and costs involved.
Washington faces a dilemma. Persistent military engagement in the Middle East is expensive, unpopular, and distracting from competition with China. Yet disengagement creates a vacuum that Iran, Türkiye, Russia, and China can exploit. The US response has therefore become selective: deter Iran where necessary, protect shipping lanes, and support partners selectively, but avoid open-ended ground commitments.
That selectivity reshapes regional behaviour. States no longer assume Washington will automatically intervene. They prepare for scenarios in which they must defend themselves, negotiate with adversaries, or diversify their security suppliers. This is why the Tehran meeting matters: it is not merely a diplomatic event; it is an early attempt at regional self-help.
China benefits from this shift without needing to replace the United States as the Gulf’s security guarantor. Beijing can offer trade, infrastructure, technology, and energy purchases while avoiding the burdens of military intervention. Russia can offer arms, diplomatic disruption, and strategic ambiguity. Türkiye can position itself as a bridge between NATO, the Muslim world, Russia, and the Gulf. Iran can present itself as the region’s indispensable local power. By contrast, the United States is increasingly asked to prove its commitments are durable.
The danger is miscalculation. If Tehran interprets American hesitation as weakness, it may press harder through proxies or maritime pressure. If Gulf states interpret American hesitation as abandonment, they may accelerate accommodation with Iran. If Israel feels politically isolated or strategically exposed, it may act unilaterally. Each path could turn diplomatic churn into military escalation.
India’s Role: Jamnagar as Strategic Leverage
India’s position in this churn is unusually consequential. Marco Rubio’s visit to Jamnagar was not a routine diplomatic stop. It recognised that India’s refining capacity has become a strategic asset in global energy politics.
Reliance’s Jamnagar complex can process about 1.4 million barrels of crude per day—roughly 1.5% of global refining capacity—and can handle heavy crude grades, including Venezuelan oil. Rubio publicly described India as a “refining superpower” and urged Reliance to process more Venezuelan crude as Washington seeks markets for expanded Venezuelan production and to ease supply pressures amid Middle East tensions.
This gives India leverage but also responsibility.
India should not interpret Rubio’s visit as a sudden ideological realignment. It is a transactional American request: Washington seeks additional non-Russian, non-Iranian supply channels; India has the refining scale and technical capability to make Venezuelan heavy crude commercially viable. India, in turn, should use this moment to secure better terms—not merely accept another supplier at Washington’s urging.
India’s energy strategy should rest on four principles.
First, diversification without dependence. Indian refiners should be free to process Venezuelan, US, West African, Middle Eastern, and other crudes based on price, quality, and logistics. India should resist any arrangement that turns energy diversification into a new form of political dependence.
Second, refining as diplomacy. Jamnagar gives India a seat at the table in global energy discussions. A country that can refine 1.4 million barrels per day at a single complex is not merely an oil buyer; it is a stabiliser of product supply for Asia, Africa and beyond. India should reflect this in its negotiations with the US, Gulf states, Russia, and Venezuela.
Third, strategic autonomy. India’s relationship with the United States is vital, but it should not become exclusive. India must maintain workable ties with Russia, the Gulf, Iran, ASEAN, Africa, and Europe. The Tehran meeting underscores why: if the Middle East is building regional mechanisms without Washington, India cannot afford to be absent from those conversations.
Fourth, maritime preparedness. The Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea remain chokepoints. Rubio himself linked Venezuelan crude and Indian refining to the need to navigate risks along these routes. India must therefore invest in naval presence, port resilience, strategic petroleum reserves, currency-settlement mechanisms, and alternative shipping arrangements.
India’s opportunity lies in becoming a bridge power. It is a major democracy, a large energy consumer, a refining hub, an Indian Ocean naval power, and a country with credible ties to both the United States and Russia. It can speak to Iran without being Iran’s patron; it can work with the Gulf without being absorbed into an anti-Iran bloc; and it can cooperate with Washington without accepting American strategic direction.
India must avoid two errors.
The first is overconfidence. Being courted by Washington does not mean India has become indispensable to American strategy. Rubio’s visit to Jamnagar reflects the US’s immediate need for energy options and India’s refining capacity. When that need passes, American attention may shift.
The second is passivity. India should not wait for the US, China, or the Gulf to define the regional architecture. It should propose practical mechanisms: energy corridors, shipping-security coordination, payment systems resilient to sanctions shocks, and dialogue platforms that, where feasible, include Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Israel.
The Emerging Order
The world entering 2027 will not be neatly bipolar or multipolar. It will be a world of overlapping spheres, transactional alliances, and regional self-help.
The Tehran meeting suggests the Middle East is beginning to organise around local realities rather than American preferences. Israel’s contested election suggests that even a central US partner can be a source of regional uncertainty. The US midterms suggest that Washington’s foreign-policy continuity may become more fragile: Democrats are widely forecast to retake the House, and models give them a strong chance of taking the Senate. Rubio’s Jamnagar visit also shows that the United States now needs partners like India not only as strategic balancers but also as practical suppliers of energy stability.
For India, the message is clear: this is not a moment to choose between Washington, Moscow, Tehran, or Riyadh. It is a moment to become more useful to all of them while remaining subordinate to none.
The great unravelling is underway. Prudent states should not mourn the old order but build the institutions, energy resilience, and diplomatic flexibility needed to survive the next.